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I. INTRODUCTION
Doing business through the legal fiction' of a corporate entity
dates back to the Middle Ages.2 The primary purpose for the creation
of corporations is to insulate the principals from personal liability,3
which tends to encourage new enterprise. However, there are many cir-
cumstances under which officers and directors may be personally liable
as a result of their acts or status in connection with the affairs of a
* Robert L. Jennings is a partner with the law firm of Holland & Knight. He
received an A.B. from Harvard University with honors in 1979 and a J.D. from the
University of Florida with honors in 1982. He concentrates his practice in commercial
litigation and trial practice.
** Kenneth A. Horky is a litigation associate with the law firm of Holland &
Knight. He received his J.D. with honors from the Florida State University College of
Law in 1986, and served as senior judicial clerk to Judge Anne C. Booth of the First
District Court of Appeal from 1987 to 1990. He concentrates his practice in commer-
cial litigation, with particular emphasis on representation of financial institutions.
1. The corporation is an "artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). Apart from the persons through whom it acts, "a corporation
is a mere incorporeal legal entity created by government." Smetal Corp. v. West Lake
Inv. Co., 126 Fla. 595, 626, 172 So. 58, 71 (1936).
2. Many towns and guilds sought protection for their business ventures by royal
charter from the eleventh century onward. B. TIERNEY & S. PAINTER, WESTERN Eu-
ROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 240 (2d ed. 1970). Joint stock companies became prevalent
as a means for funding and promoting overseas commerce in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. R. K. WEBB, MODERN ENGLAND 17 (1968). The right to form joint
stock companies was severely limited in England after the disastrous collapse of specu-
lative stocks in the "South Sea Bubble" of 1720. Id. at 24-25 (1968). The original
purpose of joint stock companies was simply to spread the risk of an enterprise by
increasing the number of investors, as the investors were individually liable for the
company's obligations. Limited liability companies were not generally recognized until
the mid-nineteenth century. See id. at 17; LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS 198
(1969).
3. State ex rel. Continental Distilling Sales Co. v. Vocelle, 158 Fla. 100, 102, 27
So. 2d 728, 729 (1946). It is not considered fraudulent or contrary to public policy to
limit liability through use of the corporate form. Miller v. Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d
769, 773 (lst Cir. 1985).
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corporation.' Even if ultimately exonerated from personal liability, cor-
porate officers and directors may be subjected to substantial expense
and anxiety in defending claims asserted against them.
In recent years, the exposure of officers and directors has greatly
expanded, 5 as new theories of liability are developed by plaintiffs in
search of a deep pocket. While a certain amount of personal accounta-
bility may be desirable,6 this trend may discourage qualified persons
from serving as officers and directors.'
Corporations have attempted to mitigate the risk to their officers
and directors by providing for their indemnification. The right to in-
demnification by an insolvent corporation may be of dubious value.
Nevertheless, the law governing corporate indemnification is of critical
concern where creditors are competing to recover against scarce corpo-
4. E.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962)(corporate officer criminally
liable under Sherman Act, even though acts were committed in representative capacity
on behalf of corporation); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d. Cir.
1985) (corporate officer liable as "operator" for cleanup of toxic waste site under CER-
CLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607); Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902,
907 (1st Cir. 1980)(corporate officer liable for active direction or participation in tor-
tious conduct); Higbie v. Kopy-Kat, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1975)("well
established" that corporate officers and directors can be personally liable for antitrust
damages for participating in or ratifying unlawful acts); Shultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald
Constr. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Mass. 1970) (corporate officers can be liable as
"employers" for unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 216(b) (1988)); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(i), 1813(u)(1)
(1988)("institution-affiliated party," which includes officers and directors, subject to
civil penalties for misconduct in the affairs of a federally insured financial institution);
26 U.S.C. §§ 3401(3), 3401(d) (1988)("employer," defined as person having control
over payment of wages, liable for unpaid withholding taxes). But see Joslyn Corp. v.
T.L. James Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988).
5. N. FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 9
(1974).
6. Formation of a corporation is not a matter of right, but a privilege granted by
the state. Cook v. J.T. Case Plow Works Co., 88 Fla. 421, 426-27, 96 So. 292, 294
(1923)(Whitfield, J., concurring). It therefore follows that the privilege should not be
abused by individuals seeking to avoid the consequences of their own wrongdoing.
7. See, e.g., 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 245, § 1(2)("The Legislature further finds that
the service of qualified persons on the governing boards of corporations. . .is in the
public interest and that. . .such persons should be permitted to perform without undue
concern for the possibility of litigation arising from the discharge of their duties as
policy makers. . . .")(preamble to enactment of legislation precluding corporate direc-
tors from suffering personal liability for money judgments for litigatior stemming from
corporate acts, subject to exceptions); M. SHAEFTLER, THE LIABILITIES OF OFFICE: IN-
DEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 2 (1976).
[Vol. 151358
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rate assets, particularly where a victim of fraud or mismanagement
may be subordinated to the individual who caused his loss.
In the wake of the troubles in the savings and loan and banking
industry, and the failure of other businesses in the present economic
downturn, there will be increasing pressure to identify responsible par--
ties and hold them accountable. Conversely, corporate officers and di-
rectors will look to their indemnification rights, not only for actual re-
imbursement, but as a deterrent to potential plaintiffs.
This article will discuss the history of corporate indemnification,
its present status, and offer comment on how the law may be improved
to strike a better balance between the competing policies of promoting
business interests and encouraging responsible corporate conduct.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the enactment of statutory indemnification provisions, cor-
porate indemnification was a matter of contract and the common law.
If corporate articles and by-laws failed to provide for it, officers and
directors were generally not entitled to indemnification. 8 Like most
states, Florida developed little law on the topic. Some jurisdictions
evolved conflicting principles that failed to satisfy the corporate need
for certainty.9
Within the context of shareholders' derivative suits,'0 officers and
directors who did not prevail could rarely obtain indemnification, and
8. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREC-
TORS § 20.01 (4th ed. 1988).
9. G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, JR., INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXECU-
TWIVE 79-82 (1963).
10. Shareholders' derivative suits are brought by plaintiffs purporting to act by
or in the right of the corporation, and usually challenge some aspect of management's
past or current actions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1419 (6th ed. 1990) defines a
"stockholder's derivative action," as
[a]n action by a stockholder for purpose of sustaining in his own name a
right of action existing in the corporation itself, where corporation would
be an appropriate plaintiff. It is based upon two distinct wrongs: the act
whereby corporation was caused to suffer damage, and the act of corpora-
tion itself in refusing to redress such act.
These types of suits are entirely distinct from a shareholder's direct action, which is "a
suit by a stockholder to enforce a right of action existing in him." Wolfe v. American
Say. & Loan Assoc., 539 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Of course,
third parties may also assert claims against the corporation, its officers, and directors.
See e.g., cases cited supra note 4.
1991] 1359
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could be held liable for misappropriation of corporate assets if they in-
demnified themselves over objection. 1 Distinctions eventually arose be-
tween officers and directors who acted in good faith in legitimate inter-
nal policy disputes, and those who were defeated in suits stemming
from purely personal power contests.' 2 The problem with this approach
was that power struggles are usually couched in the language of policy
disputes, and it became difficult to intelligently distinguish between
"personal" and "policy" disputes.13
The law was little clearer in cases involving officers and directors
who successfully defended derivative suits. Although some early deci-
sions assumed it was appropriate to indemnify successful officers and
directors, 4 subsequent cases distinguished situations where they were
successful, yet were sued on causes of action arising from personal
dealings only indirectly involving their corporate responsibilities. 15
Some states refined the standard by requiring successful officers
and directors seeking indemnification to demonstrate some direct bene-
fit to the corporation. However, the "direct benefit" requirement was
also unsatisfactory. Entirely blameless officers and directors were some-
times forced to bear the expense *of defending acts taken in their corpo-
rate capacities, due to failure to demonstrate that the litigation had
directly benefitted the corporation. In the landmark case of New York
Dock Co. v. McCollum, 6 a corporation and its directors were denied
indemnification despite their having successfully defended a derivative
suit seeking appointment of a receiver. After incurring substantial ex-
pense, the directors sought a declaration from the court that they were
entitled to indemnification. Although the court concluded that the cor-
poration had benefitted by avoiding appointment of the receiver, it de-
nied indemnification after finding that the successful defense was the
result of corporate counsel's efforts, rather than those of the defend-
ants. McCollum was widely criticized,' 7 and resulted in the 1941 en-
actment of the nation's first corporate indemnification statute.',
Direct benefit cases were based on the concept that, absent the
11. E.g., Wickersham v. Crittenden, 106 Cal. 329, 39 P. 603 (1895); Persey v.
Millaudon, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 68 (Orleans 1829).
12. G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, JR., supra note 9, at 79-82.
13. Id. at 81.
14. Id. at 83.
15. Id. at 84.
16. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939).
17. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP JR., supra note 9, at 87-90.
18. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 8, at § 20.04.
1360 [Vol. 15
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benefit, the corporation was without the power to indemnify.19 Some
jurisdictions rejected the direct benefit requirement, and reasoned that
successful officers and directors should be indemnified because they
should have no lesser rights than would a trustee at common law.20
These courts concluded that indirect benefits, such as demonstrating
corporate management's honesty, were of value to the corporation."'
Still other courts allowed indemnification following successful defense
upon the broader public policy grounds that without indemnification, it
might be difficult to induce responsible persons to accept corporate
office.
22
The law was also unclear in non-derivative actions such as suits
brought by third parties or criminal prosecutions. Some courts permit-
ted indemnification under an agency theory, and required a cause or
link between the action taken as an agent and the subsequent litigation.
In Hoch v. Duluth Brewing and Malting Co., 23 a corporate director
had briefly held title to a parcel of land as security for a debt to the
corporation. Many years after the debt was paid, the federal govern-
ment brought a civil fraud and conspiracy action against Hoch and
various others in the chain of title charging that they had conspired to
defraud the government of its land. Although the director defended
successfully, the court refused to allow indemnification. The court rea-
soned that the director's loss was caused by entirely unpredictable gov-
ernment misconduct, for which the corporation was in no way responsi-
ble.24 Other courts used the corporate benefit standard to find corporate
power to voluntarily indemnify unsuccessful directors who had benefit-
ted the corporation in the process of being defeated. 5
19. Frampton, Indemnification of Insiders' Litigation Expenses, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 327 (1958).
20. Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941)(trustees at
common law enjoyed right to indemnification, and corporate directors should enjoy the
same right, based on their similar responsibilities). Officers and directors occupy a fidu-
ciary or quasi fiduciary position, and though not technically trustees, occupy positions
of trust and have analogous duties. Etheredge v. Barrow, 102 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1958).
21. Solomine, 129 N.J. Eq. at 273, 19 A.2d at 348.
22. E.g., In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W. 2d 388 (1950).
23. 173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 503 (1928).
24. Id. at 375, 217 N.W. at 504.
25. See, e.g., Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942), afl'd mem. 267 A.D. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div.
1944)(director's plea of nolo contendere facilitated settlement of separate criminal an-
titrust charges against the corporation).
19911 1361
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Florida courts did not address these particular issues, however,
Florida common law did require corporations to reimburse expenses
necessarily incurred by corporate officers in the performance of their
corporate duties, where the performance of those duties conferred a
benefit on the corporation.2" The obligation was based on an implied
contract theory.
III. FLORIDA STATUTORY HISTORY
After the McCollum case, nearly all jurisdictions adopted statutes
permitting officer and director indemnification in various circum-
stances.28 Florida's first statutes on the subject were former sections
608.13 and 608.131, enacted in 1963.29
Under section 608.13(14), corporations had the power to indem-
nify officers and directors in suits by or in the right of the corporation
for reasonable fees and expenses "actually and necessarily incurred" in
defense or settlement, except where the officers or directors were ad-
judged guilty of negligence or misconduct in the performance of their
corporate duties.30 Under subsection (15), applicable to third party ac-
tions including criminal proceedings, corporations were authorized to
indemnify officers and directors for reasonable expenses "actually and
necessarily incurred as a result" of the proceeding. This included
amounts paid in settlement, to satisfy judgments, or in paying fines.
The indemnification for defensive actions under subsection (15) was
considerably broader than for suits as plaintiff under subsection (14),
which did not provide for indemnification of amounts paid in
settlement. 3
However, persons seeking indemnification in third party actions
were required to demonstrate a good faith reasonable belief that their
actions were taken "in the best interests of the corporation. 32 In crimi-
nal proceedings, the officer or director was also required to prove that
he had no reasonable ground for belief that his actions were unlawful.
The statute further provided that termination of civil or criminal ac-
26. Flight Equip. and Eng'g Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So. 2d 615, 1525 (Fla. 1958).
27. Id.
28. N. FEUER, supra note 5, at 205.
29. 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 286; § 1, ch. 304, § 1.
30. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14) (1963) (repealed 1975).
31. Compare FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14) with FLA. STAT. § 608.13(15) (1963) (re-
pealed 1975).
. 32. § 608.13(15).
1362 [Vol. 15
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tions by settlement, conviction, judgment or plea of nolo contendere did
not itself create a presumption that the above standards were vio-
lated. 3 The power to indemnify under section 608.13 existed unless
otherwise provided by the corporation's certificate of incorporation.3 4
Section 608.131(5) allowed successful plaintiffs in derivative ac-
tions to obtain the reasonable expenses of maintaining the suit, includ-
ing attorneys' fees. 5 Under subsection (4), plaintiffs holding less than
five percent of the corporation's outstanding shares could be required to
post. security for reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, for
which the corporation might become liable for indemnification under
section 608.13(14). The security provisions were designed to prevent
so-called "strike suits" by shareholders, and did not apply to plaintiffs
owning stock valued in excess of $50,000.00.7
The 1963 indemnification statutes remained unchanged until 1970
and 1971, when they were substantially expanded. Under the 1971
statute, not only parties, but those threatened to be made parties, could
be indemnified.38 Additionally,, the expenses to be indemnified did not
have to be incurred in an action, but could also be incurred in a
"threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding." 39 Under
subsection 14(a), applicable to non-derivative actions, the class of per-
sons eligible for indemnification was expanded from officers and direc-
tors to include employees and agents.4 0 Additionally, indemnification
was made available to those affiliated with partnerships, joint ventures,
trusts or other enterprises.4 1 These expansions also applied to derivative
actions. 2
The 1971 statute also significantly changed the provisions applica-
ble to derivative actions. Indemnification was only available upon meet-
33. Id.
34. FLA. STAT. § 608.13 (1963) (repealed 1975).
35. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(5) (1963) (repealed 1975).
36. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(4) (1963) (repealed 1975).
37. See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Peters, 175 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1965); "Strike suits" are defined as derivative actions brought by shareholders with the
ulterior purpose of inducing the defendants to buy the plaintiff's shares. Leppert v.
Lakebreeze Homeowners Assoc., Inc., 500 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
38. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14) (1971).
39. Id.
40. § 608.13(14)(a).
41. Id.
42. § 608.13(14)(b).
1991] 1363
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ing the good faith and reasonable belief standards already applicable to
third party actions.4" However, the former statute's automatic exclu-
sion from indemnification of those adjudged guilty of negligence or
misconduct was relaxed to allow indemnification, if the court approved
in view of all the circumstances."
In addition to altering the requirements for permissive indemnifi-
cation in derivative and third party actions, the 1971 statute also incor-
porated the first mandatory indemnification provision. Under subsec-
tion 14(c), indemnification of expenses "actually and necessarily
incurred" was available to those found "successful on the merits or oth-
erwise in defense of any action, suit or [other] proceeding . . . or in
defense of any claim, issue or matter therein."' 5
The statute also provided mechanisms for approval of permissive
indemnification, and broadened its availability. Subsection 14(d) estab-
lished a requirement that permissive indemnification be approved by a
majority vote of a quorum of disinterested members of the board of
directors, or by non-party shareholders.46 Under subsection (15), corpo-
rations were also empowered to advance expenses prior to the conclu-
sion of the suit. This also required a majority vote of a quorum of disin-
terested directors or a majority vote of disinterested shareholders, and
required that the person to be indemnified, or someone on his behalf,
undertake to repay the advancement if it was not ultimately deter-
mined that indemnification was appropriate. 7 Subsection (16) created
a non-exclusivity provision expressly recognizing that statutory indem-
nification under subsections (14) and (15) did not preclude other in-
demnification rights created under "by-law, agreement, vote of share-
holders or disinterested directors, or otherwise."48 Additionally,
indemnification under subsections (14) and (15) was available for ac-
tions taken in an official capacity, or taken in another capacity while
holding office. 49 Moreover, such indemnification was required to con-
tinue after the official's position terminated, and to inure to the benefit
of the indemnitee's heirs, executors, and administrators."°
Finally, under subsection (17), Florida adopted its first provision
43. Id.; cf. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(15).
44. Id.
45. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14)(c) (1971) (repealed 1975).
46. § 608.13(14)(d).
47. § 608.13(15).
48. § 608.13(16).
49. Id.
50. Id.
1364 [Vol. 15
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allowing corporations to purchase and maintain directors' and officers'
insurance. Such insurance could cover any liability asserted based upon
acts in an official corporate capacity, or upon official status, and was
not limited by the constraints of subsection (14).51
These statutes remained unchanged until 1975, when they were
automatically repealed.52 Following repeal, the Legislature enacted a
substantially revised statutory scheme based on the 1969 Model Corpo-
ration Business Act.53 These revisions were part of the first comprehen-
sive overhaul of Florida's corporation act since 1953,5" but the new
statute did not enact the Model Act verbatim.55 The principal purpose
of the revisions was described as clarification." However, review of the
1975 statute demonstrates that a number of substantive changes were
implemented.
The new statute, section 607.014, relaxed the permissive indemni-
fication requirement from good faith and a reasonable belief that the
acts taken were in the best interest of the corporation, to good faith
belief that the acts taken were "not opposed to" the best interests of
the corporation.5 7 The statute also permitted indemnification of ex-
penses "actually and reasonably incurred,"58 although the prior statute
required that the expenses be "actually and necessarily incurred." Sec-
tion 607.014(5), providing for advancement of expenses, was clarified
to require a finding that the subsection (1) or subsection (2) "good
faith" and "reasonable belief' standards had been met.51 Under sub-
51. § 608.13(17). The statute was also designed to facilitate the speedy provision
of a defense during litigation. See SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
STATEMENT, S.B. 1096, 10th Leg. (April 23, 1987) ("[s]ince the section permits insur-
ance coverage in areas not clearly indemnifiable by the corporation, directors and
others were able to arrange with an insurance carrier for the funding of legal fees
associated with the defense of a claim without having a preliminary determination by
• . .procedures defined in the statute").
52. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 250, § 139.
53. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1096,
10th Leg. (April 23, 1987).
54. SENATE JUDICIARY-CIVIL COMMITTEE, STAFF ANALYSIS, S.B. 520, 4th Leg.
(May 23, 1975).
55. Id.
56. Letter from C. McFerrin Smith, III, Executive Director to the Law Revision
Council, to the Office of the Governor (June 9, 1975).
57. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(1)(2) (1975) (repealed 1989); STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B.
1395, 4th Leg. (1975).
58. § 607.014(1)(2).
59. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(5) (1975) (repealed 1989).
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section (6), the non-exclusivity provision was also clarified and set new
limits. Under the new non-exclusivity provision, applicable to permis-
sive indemnification by the corporation but not to court-approved in-
demnification as otherwise provided, indemnification was not allowed
for acts involving gross negligence or willful misconduct.60 Addition-
ally, under subsection (9), corporations were required to provide notice
to shareholders of indemnifications not authorized by a court, by the
shareholders themselves, or paid for by insurance.6'
Section 608.131 was also renumbered to 607.147 and revised.6 2 In
addition, the Legislature enlarged the potential class of derivative
plaintiffs by including those who were stockholders at the time of suit,
although not necessarily at the time a cause of action accrued.6 3 The
Legislature also enacted the first provision authorizing co3urts to order
unsuccessful plaintiffs to pay the defendants' reasonable expenses, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, where the action was brought "without reasona-
ble cause." 64
The 1975 version remained virtually unchanged until 1980, when
the Legislature created a new alternative to approval of indemnification
by disinterested directors or shareholder vote. Section 607.014(4)(b)
permitted approval of indemnification by written opinion of indepen-
dent legal counsel, in the absence of a quorum of disinterested direc-
tors, or if directed by such a quorum. 5 Additionally, section
607.014(5) was amended to provide that only the board of directors
could authorize advance indemnification.66 A 1981 amendment made
clear that the Legislature intended the subsection (6) non-exclusivity
provisions to apply equally to officers, directors, employees and
agents.67
IV. THE CURRENT STATUTE
The statute was substantially revised in 1987, and again in 1989.
60. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(6) (1975 (repealed 1989).
61. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(9) (1975) (repealed 1989).
62. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 80-349, § 50.
63. FLA. STAT. § 607.147(1) (1975) (repealed 1989).
64. FLA. STAT. § 607.147(4) (1975) (repealed 1989). However, the possibility of
an unsuccessful plaintiff having to pay fees was apparently contemplated under former
section 608.131(4).
65. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 349, § 1.
66. Id.
67. 1981 Fla. Laws ch. 155, § 2.
1366 [Vol. 15
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The 1989 revisions updated the entire Corporation Act to more closely
follow the Revised Model Business Corporation Act adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1984.8 The statute was further reorga-
nized in 1990, but the present indemnification provisions are substan-
tially unchanged from the 1987 version.69
In 1987, section 607.014(2), which applies to derivative suits, was
amended to permit indemnification of amounts paid in settlement
which did not exceed the board of directors' estimate of the expense
necessary to litigate the proceeding to a conclusion. 0 Previously, only
amounts paid in settlement of third patty actions could be indemnified.
The purpose of the amendment was to encourage settlement of deriva-
tive actions.7 1 Additionally, the previous restrictions on permissive in-
demnification of those found liable for negligence or misconduct were
broadened to include all those found liable in a proceeding. The more
liberal restriction, however, did not apply to court-ordered indemnifica-
tion.72 The Legislature also provided that any court of competent juris-
diction, not only the one where the proceeding was brought, could order
indemnification.7 3
Subsection (4) was also expanded in 1987 to allow indemnification
approval by a committee designated by the board of directors. 74 Inter-
ested directors could participate in selecting the committee.7 5 Addition-
ally, if independent legal counsel was utilized, the means of selecting
that counsel was expanded to permit selection by a disinterested board
committee.7 6 Subsection (5) was amended to provide that independent
legal counsel could determine whether permissive indemnification con-
68. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1460,
1 lth Leg. (March 9, 1990); SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATE-
MENT, S.B. 0851, 1lth Leg. (May 9, 1989).
69. The text of the pertinent provisions of the current statute is set out in the
Appendix, infra.
70. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(2) (1987) (repealed 1989).
71. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1096,
10th Leg. (April 23, 1987). The apparent rationale was that there was no prejudice to
the corporation in paying monies which would otherwise be spent in litigation. How-
ever, projecting litigation expenses is such a subjective exercise that management could
conceivably justify almost any settlement.
72. § 607.014(2).
73. Id.
74. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(4)(b) (1987) (repealed 1989).
75. Id.
76. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(4)(c)(1)(2) (1987) (repealed 1989); SENATE STAFF
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1096, 10th Leg. (April 23, 1987).
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duct standards were met, but could not authorize the indemnification."
Subsection (6) was amended to make advancement of expenses
virtually automatic upon a promise to repay, and to put the burden on
the corporation to determine whether the party receiving advancement
was not ultimately entitled and should repay after the conclusion of the
action.78 For employees and agents, even a promise to repay was unnec-
essary for advancement.7 9 Under subsection (7), the non-exclusivity
provision was clarified to demonstrate that it applied to advancement.8"
However, it was limited because it provided that indemnification was
not allowed where a person's acts were material to a cause of action
and (1) violated the criminal law without reasonable cause to believe
that the conduct was lawful, (2) resulted in an officer receiving an im-
proper personal benefit, (3) involved an improper dividend distribution,
or (4) in derivative actions, involved willful misconduct or conscious
disregard for the best interests of the corporation. 8' The effect of these
amendments was to sharply curtail the statute's non-exclusivity provi-
sions for permissive indemnification. However, in the case of corporate
directors, this was offset by the 1987 enactment of new liability limita-
tions precluding a director's personal liability for monetary damages
unless serious misconduct was demonstrated. 82
The continuing indemnification provisions of subsection (8) were
amended to clarify their application to advancement, as well as indem-
nification. They were also amended to allow corporations, at the time
they initially authorized indemnification or advancement, to limit its
extent for persons no longer officers, directors, employees or agents, or
their heirs.83 Subsection (9) was also amended. The new version pro-
vided that unless a corporation's articles of incorporation stated other-
wise, persons seeking indemnification or advancement could apply di-
rectly to a court.84 Subsections (10) and (11) defined terms under the
statute, and expanded the term "agent" to include volunteers.85 Addi-
tionally, the "not opposed to the best interests of the corporation" stan-
77. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(5) (1987) (repealed 1989).
78. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(6) (1987) (repealed 1989); SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS
AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1096, 10th Leg. (April 23, 1987).
79. § 607.014(6).
80. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(7) (1987) (repealed (1989).
81. Id.
82. See 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 154, § 85.
83. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(8) (1987) (repealed 1989).
84. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(9)(a)(b)(c) (1987) (repealed 1989).
85. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(11)(e) (1987) (repealed 1989).
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dard was defined to include consideration of the best interests of the
participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans."'
The 1987 Legislature also supplemented the indemnification provi-
sions with new sections 607.1645 and 607.165, limiting corporate direc-
tors' personal liability for money judgments stemming from acts or fail-
ures to act concerning corporate management or policy decisions.8 7
Under the new sections, directors were exempted from personal liability
to the corporation, or any other persons, for acts or omissions regarding
corporate management or policy, unless the director breached or other-
wise failed to perform his duties and (1) violated the criminal law with-
out reasonable cause to believe his conduct was lawful, (2) was en-
gaged in a transaction from which he derived an improper personal
benefit, (3) made an improper distribution, (4) engaged in willful mis-
conduct or consciously disregarded the best interests of the corporation
in a shareholders' derivative proceeding, or (5) in a non-derivative pro-
ceeding, committed reckless, bad faith, or malicious acts exhibiting
willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety or property. 8
"Recklessness" was defined as a director's conscious disregard of a risk
known, or so obvious that it should have been known, and from which
harm was "highly probable" to follow.89
Certain limitations precluded a finding of improper personal bene-
fit where the benefit and underlying transaction were not prohibited by
state or federal authorities.90 In non-derivative actions, a finding of im-
proper personal benefit is precluded where the benefit was disclosed,
approved by the directors or shareholders, and is fair and reasonable.9 1
Although a judgment or "other final adjudication" against a director in
a criminal proceeding estopped him from contesting that his acts were
a violation of the criminal law,92 the director was still entitled to at-
tempt to prove that he had reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
lawful, or no reasonable cause to believe it was unlawful.9 3
Although this provision might appear to sharply curtail the need
for director indemnification, it applies only to judgments, and has no
86. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(11)(g) (1987) (repealed 1989).
87. 1987 Fla. Laws. ch. 245, § 5, 6; FLA. STAT. §§ 607.1645, 607.165 (1987)
(repealed 1989).
88. § 607.1645(1).
89. § 607.1645(2).
90. § 607.165(1).
91. § 607.165(1)(a)(b)(c).
92. § 607.1645(1)(b).
93. Id.
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effect on a director's potential liability for attorneys! fees and other
expenses of defense, or monies paid in settlement. To date, no judicial
decisions have interpreted the statute.
In 1989, no significant amendments were made to Section 607.014
pertaining to indemnification in general. 94 However, in 1990, the Legis-
lature renumbered the statute as section 607.0850.95 As part of its stat-
utory reorganization, the Legislature separated subsection (13) indem-
nification notice requirements from the rest of the indemnification
statute. The new notice provisions are found at newly created section
607.1621.96 The Legislature also reenacted former section 607.147,
pertaining to derivative actions, which had been automatically repealed
in 1989,11 as new section 607.07401. 91 Under the current version, a
court may no longer require shareholders' derivative suit plaintiffs to
post security for the reasonable costs and expenses of the action." The
new director liability limitation provisions were also combined, renum-
bered and transferred to section 607.0831.100
Subsection (1) of section 607.0850 provides for indemnification in
third party actions and continues to employ the "good faith" and "rea-
sonable belief" standards for actions taken in, or not opposed to, the
best interests of the corporation. 10 1 In criminal proceedings, indemnifi-
cation remains available if the person had no reasonable cause to be-
lieve his conduct was unlawful. 10 2 Subsection (2), applicable to actions
by or in the right of the corporation, also continues to utilize the "good
faith" and "reasonable belief" standards. However, it precludes indem-
nification for persons adjudged liable unless the court concludes that
indemnification is "fair and reasonable" under the circumstances. 10 3
No standards are articulated to assist the court in making its
94. See generally SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT,
S.B. 0851, 11th Leg. (May 9, 1989).
95. FLA. STAT. § 607.0850 (1990); SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IM-
PACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1460, 1lth Leg. (March 9, 1990).
96. FLA. STAT. § 607.1621 (1990).
97. 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 154, § 166.
98. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 179, § 148.
99. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.147 (1975) (repealed 1989) with FLA. STAT. §
607.07401 (1990).
100. 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 154, § 85.
101. FLA. STAT. § 607.0850(1) (1990).
102. Id.
103. § 607.0850(2).
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determination.0 4
Subsection (3) continues to provide mandatory indemnification for
officers, directors, agents and employees who are "successful on the
merits or otherwise" in defense of a proceeding.1 0 5 Subsection (4) limits
the corporation to permissively' indemnify only those persons meeting
subsection (1) and (2) standards, and prescribes who may make the
determination."' 8 Subsection (5) provides a method for determining
whether claimed expenses are reasonable, and continues to limit inde-
pendent legal counsel to determining whether indemnification should be
allowed while requiring others to set the amounts.1 7 Advance indemni-
fication remains available under subsection (6),108 and the subsection
(7) non-exclusivity provisions remain intact although subject to excep-
tions.109 Under subsection (8), indemnification and advancement re-
main.110 Under subsection (9), a court of competent jurisdiction re-
mains empowered to order indemnification upon application and proof
of certain standards.1 Subsections (10) and (11) provide various defi-
nitions and subsection (12) allows a corporation to purchase directors'
and officers' insurance." 2 Section 607.1621 continues to require notice
to shareholders for indemnification other than by court order, insur-
ance, or the shareholders themselves.11 3 The notice must be sent prior
to the next shareholders' meeting, and requires specification of the per-
sons paid, amounts paid, and the nature of the litigation involved.11 4
Under section 617.028, section 607.0850 indemnification is also
available to the directors, managers and trustees of non-profit corpora-
tions and rural electric cooperatives. 115 The section 607.0831 director
liability limitation provisions remain unchanged from the 1989 version,
b~ut former section 607.147(4) provisions providing for payment of ex-
penses including attorneys' fees in shareholders' derivative actions
brought without reasonable cause, was rewritten when it was trans-
104. Id.
105. § 607.0850(3).
106. § 607.0850(4).
107. § 607.0850(5).
108. § 607.0850(6).
109. § 607.0850(7).
110. § 607.0850(8).
111. § 607.0850(9)(a)(b)(c).
112. § 607.0850(10)(11)(12).
113. FLA. STAT. § 607.1621(1) (1990).
114. Id.
115. FLA. STAT. § 617.028 (1990).
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ferred to section 607.07401(5).
V. ANALYSIS AND COMMENT
A. Derivative Actions
Although not strictly speaking an indemnification statute, the pro-
visions of current statute section 607.07401(5)(a) effectively supple-
ment Florida's statutory indemnification scheme and provide as follows:
"On termination of the proceeding, the court may require the plaintiff
to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including reasonable attor-
neys' fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that the pro-
ceeding was commenced without reasonable cause.""' 6
Several points concerning section 607.07401(5) merit comment.
First, the claim for fees arises upon "termination of the proceeding."
Former statute section 607.147(4) applied only "upon final judg-
ment,""' 7 apparently barring any claim on a case settled short of
judgment.
Second, the court must find that the proceeding was brought with-
out reasonable cause, which has been interpreted to require that there
be no merit to any of the claims advanced against any of the parties. In
Winner v. Cataldo,"8 the Third District Court of Appeal observed that
to allow a single successful defendant fees against the plaintiff would
have a chilling effect on meritorious derivative claims. Perhaps the
court was concerned that minority shareholders would ordinarily not be
in a position to determine which of the officers or directors were at
fault, and believed it was appropriate to permit the plaintiff to sue
them all and require the defendants to establish among themselves who
was responsible."l 9
However, as the award of fees is purely discretionary, the deter-
rent effect against meritless claims is questionable. The defendant
could establish a stronger claim to fees merely by offering a nominal
settlement under Rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 20
116. FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(5) (1990).
117. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.147(4) (1975) (repealed 1989) with FLA. STAT.
§ 607.07401(5) (1990).
118. 559 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
119. See, e.g., Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956, 967-68 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Vahey v. Sacin, 126 Cal. App. 3d 171, 178 Cal. Rptr. 559 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1981)(burden on defendant to show which of multiple tortfeasors caused the harm).
120. The court may impose sanctions equal to reasonable attorneys' fees and all
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The absence of reasonable cause is a difficult standard in view of
the modest requirements for bringing a derivative suit. Cases interpret-
ing earlier versions of the statute held that plaintiff stockholders were
not required to have direct knowledge of misconduct in order to bring a
derivative action.12' If the record reflected colorable support for the
claims asserted, the action was considered viable.'22 The current statute
requires a verified complaint alleging with particularity the action
taken to obtain remedial board action, but does not otherwise appear to
require direct knowledge.'2 3 Additionally, the plaintiff need not be a
stockholder at the time the action is brought; it is sufficient if he was a
stockholder at the time the cause of action arose. 124
Finally, as "reasonable cause" is understood to be something less
than "probable cause,' 25 and initiating an action without probable
cause is actionable as malicious prosecution, 26 there appears to be lit-
tle if any benefit to asserting a claim for fees under section
607.07401(5). A successful defendant who could establish the absence
of probable cause in a separate action would be absolutely entitled to
recover. The same defendant claiming fees at the conclusion of a suc-
cessful defense against a derivative action could recover only if he
could satisfy the more stringent absence of reasonable cause standard,
and recovery would still be subject to the virtually unbridled discretion
of the trial court.
Balanced against the defendant's potential indemnification or re-
covery of fees is the successful plaintiff's claim for fees. Section
607.07401(6) permits the court to award the successful plaintiff in a
derivative action his reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees. 27
The court must first find, however, some benefit to the corporation or
reasonable costs of the litigation from the date of an offer of judgment which was
unreasonably rejected, where the damages awarded to the offeree are less than 75 per-
cent of the offer. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(h), superseding in part FLA. STAT. §§ 768.79,
45.061 (1990). See The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rules, 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla.
1989).
121. DiGiovanni v. All-Pro Golf, Inc., 332 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
122. Id. at 94.
123. FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(2) (1990).
124. § 607.07401(l).
125. United States v. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d 1126, 1133 (1lth Cir. 1987).
126. See Burns v. GCC Beverages, 502 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1986).
127. FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(6) (1990). See infra Appendix.
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the other shareholders. 2 "
The defendants cannot thwart recovery by voluntarily granting the
plaintiff's requested relief before judgment. Where the case is rendered
moot by corporate action, the corporation has the burden of establish-
ing the action was not caused by the lawsuit.' 29 However, although sec-
tion 607.07401(4) requires court approval for settlement of derivative
claims, and subsections (5) and (6) permit the court to award fees, the
court is without authority to require payment of fees as part of a
settlement.' °
B. Other Indemnification
Little case law interprets the permissive indemnification provisions
of section 607.0850 and its predecessor statutory versions. As earlier
outlined, sections 607.0850(1),(2) and (9), Florida Statutes, permit a
corporation to indemnify its officers and directors, and subsection (6)
permits advancement of expenses of defense prior to determination of
the controversy.' These provisions are subject only to the conflict of
interest limitations of section 607.0850(4), which generally require the
interested officer or director to abstain from the corporation's determi-
nation of indemnification.
Although it has been argued that the language of subsection (4)
implies that the court may order indemnification under sections (1) or
(2) if the corporation refuses, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled
in Mosley v. DeMoya 32 that these provisions merely permit the corpo-
ration to indemnify if it sees fit.
The only mandatory indemnification provision is found in
607.0850(3)."33 Subsection (3) mandatory indemnification is self-exe-
cuting, and does not depend on a corporation's enactment of an ena-
128. Id.; see also Lane v. Head, 566 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1990); United Parts, Inc.
v. Tillis, 432 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(both interpreting former section
607.147(5), Florida Statutes).
129. Ginsberg v. Keehn, 550 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(inter-
preting former section 607.147(5), Florida Statutes).
130. Levenson v. American Laser Corp., 438 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (interpreting former section 607.147(2)(5), Florida Statutes).
131. FLA. STAT. § 607.0850(1),(2) and (9) (1990). See infra Appendix.
132. 497 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(interpreting former section
607.014(1)(2)(4), Florida Statutes).
133. See infra Appendix.
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bling provision in its articles of incorporation or elsewhere. 34 The only
apparent limitation on this entitlement to indemnification is that the
conduct giving rise to the claim must not have been ultra vires. 1 5 Al-
though Florida's jurisprudence has not addressed any particularly egre-
gious examples of claims arising from corporate status but based upon
ultra vires acts of corporate officials, the problem has occasionally
arisen in other states with similar statutes. 36
The "successful on the merits or otherwise" language is one of the
statute's more controversial provisions and has not been uniformly
adopted by all Model Act jurisdictions. Under the Model Act and stat-
utes following it, a defense must be "wholly successful on the merits or
otherwise."' 3 Other jurisdictions have adopted the more rigorous stan-
dard of "successful on the merits."' 38 It is difficult to understand why
adding "or otherwise" was deemed necessary. A defendant who
prevails for any reason is absolutely entitled to indemnification, which
is the identical result achieved if the statute simply required indemnifi-
cation for any successful defendant. Equally mysterious is why the
Legislature determined that a corporate defendant who escaped liabil-
ity on a mere technicality should be entitled to indemnification at all.
Although the proponents of the Model Business Corporation Act ex-
plained that it would be "unreasonable to require a defendant with a
valid procedural defense to undergo a possibly prolonged and expensive
trial on the merits in order to establish eligibility for mandatory indem-
134. Penthouse North Ass'n, Inc. v. Lombardi, 436 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App, 1983)(interpreting former section 607.014(3), Florida Statutes).
135. See, State ex rel. Blatt v. Panelfab Int'l Corp., 314 So. 2d. 196 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(mandamus compelling indemnification under former section
607.014(3), Florida Statutes, inappropriate for successful defense of criminal charges
where record disclosed a fact dispute as to whether the underlying conduct resulted in
whole or in part from conduct outside scope of corporate duties).
136. E.g., Kaufman v. CBS, Inc., 135 Misc. 2d 64, 514 N.Y.S.2d 621 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1987). Kaufman, a former CBS vice president, was sued by a female
employee for a variety of intentional torts after he allegedly "grabbed" a piece of her
clothing and made a lewd remark about her at a business dinner. Interpreting New
York's analogous statute, the court found that the conduct was an "obvious deviation"
from Kaufman's work responsibilities and could not reasonably be construed as an act
within the scope of employment. Id., 514 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
137. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 1120.1 (3d ed. 1984).
138. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Schigur, 148 Cal. Rptr. 116, 83
Cal. App. 3d 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)(construing CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West
1977)).
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nification,"'' 9 this does not explain why the expenses of the litigation
should be shifted from the wrongdoer to the corporation. Officers and
directors who happen to be sued and win should be required to make a
case to the corporation for permissive indemnification, or at very least
be subject to the "good faith" and "reasonable belief" requirements of
section 607.0850(1) and (2).
Moreover, Florida's omission of the Model Act's "wholly success-
ful" standard may make it necessary to indemnify those who are par-
tially successful in defending an action but may be unsuccessful as a
whole. Jurisdictions lacking this language have faced difficult problems
in separating expenses subject to indemnification from those which are
not. In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 4 " a Delaware
court was forced to determine whether a criminal defendant who had
successfully obtained dismissal of a federal securities fraud element of
a conspiracy count, but was later convicted on the count, was entitled
to mandatory indemnification. Although the court concluded that Dela-
ware's indemnification statute 41 did not allow indemnification for this
type of partial success, another appellate panel subsequently had to re-
solve whether Wolfson was entitled to mandatory indemnification for
dismissal of some counts despite conviction on others. Reasoning that
statutory language did not require success in all aspects of' the suit, and
that in a criminal action, any result other than a conviction was a suc-
cess, the court concluded that Wolfson was entitled to indemnification
for counts dismissed under a plea bargain agreement.1 42
What constitutes "success on the merits or otherwise" has been
heavily litigated. Voluntary dismissals with prejudice,' 43 dismissals for
failure to post security for expenses (even where the suit was subse-
quently refiled),' 44 failure to indict following an investigation, 45 dismis-
sal of some although not all charges, 46 outright acquittal, 41 a plaintiff
139. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 8, at § 20.11.
140. 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970)[hereinafter "Wolfson I"].
141. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1969).
142. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A. 2d 138 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974)[hereinafter "Wolfson Ir'].
143. B&B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
144. Tichner v. Andrews, 193 Misc. 1050, 85 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1949).
145. Stewart v. Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc., 67 A.D. 293, 414
N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
146. Wolfson 1, 264 A.2d 358.
147. Green v. Westcap Corp., 492 A.2d 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); PS&S, Inc.
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voluntarily requesting a non-suit,148 and dismissal with prejudice due to
bar by the statute of limitations, 149 have all been found encompassed
within the phrase "or otherwise."
Some courts have found it necessary to draw a line -and refuse
indemnification for technical successes without substantive meaning. In
Galdi v. Berg,5 ' a federal district court construing Delaware's indem-
nification statute refused to permit indemnification for a defendant af-
ter the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its case without prejudice. The
court noted that another suit was currently being litigated which in-
volved exactly the same issues, arid concluded that despite the dismis-
sal, the issue remained unresolved because it survived in the other suit.
Accordingly, the court determined that the defendant had failed to ob-
tain success on the merits or otherwise. In another instance, a court
technically required to acquit a defendant of criminal charges, ex-
pressed its belief that the defendant should or would still be punished
in civil actions."5 Nevertheless, that same defendant subsequently ob-
tained indemnification for his successful defense of the criminal
charges after the court concluded that Delaware's subsection 145(a)
and 145(b) requirements for good faith, were not incorporated by ref-
erence into section 145(c) "successful on the merits or otherwise"
standard. 52
In the context of the current troubles with failed financial institu-
tions, the Office of Thrift Supervision has promulgated regulations al-
lowing administrative authorities to object to indemnification of some
former savings and loan officers and directors under applicable statutes.
Under the federal regulations, the objection will automatically prohibit
indemnification. 5
Eliminating the "or otherwise" language would limit required in-
demnification, to situations where a judicial determination has been
made on the merits. For example, in American National Bank and
v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 3d 354, 94 Cal. Rptr. 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1971).
148. Stanley v. Brassfield, Cowan & Howard, 152 Il. App. 378, 504 N.E.2d 542
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
149. Dornan v. Humphrey, 278 A.D. 1010, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. App. Div.
1951).
150. 359 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1973).
151. Green, 492 A.2d 260.
152. Id. These provisions are analogous to section 607.0850(1)(2)(3), Florida
Statutes. See infra Appendix.
153. 12 C.F.R. § 545.121(c)(2)(iii)(1990).
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Trust Co. v. Schigur,15" a California court refused to allow mandatory
indemnification following a settlement and voluntary dismissal with
prejudice. Contrasting the California provision requiring "success on
the merits"' 155 with the Model Act provision requiring "success on the
merits or otherwise," the court held that because the merits were not
judicially determined, no indemnification was required. 56
Since permissive indemnification is still available under subsec-
tions (1) and (2) of Florida Statutes section 607.0850, elimination of
the "or otherwise" language would still allow indemnification in most
situations where procedural defenses prevailed, should the corporation
decide it was appropriate. If, as suggested by some courts, the purpose
of the mandatory indemnification provision is to prevent vindicated of-
ficers and directors from a corporation's refusal to indemnify after
change in management, this problem could be treated by drafting a
mandatory indemnification provision broad enough to encompass ad-
verse managerial shifts while not requiring mandatory indemnification
of those who escape liability other than on the merits. 57
Further statutory clarification of mandatory indemnification may
also be necessary in other contexts. At least one court has concluded
that the word "successful" requires appellate finality, thereby preclud-
ing mandatory indemnification where a judgment has been rendered in
an officer's or director's favor but an appeal still remains pending. 58
Other courts have wrestled with the necessity of indemnifying former
attorneys for corporations who successfully defend malpractice suits
brought against them by their prior clients. In this context, a California
court concluded in Katayama v. Interpacific Properties, Inc.,59 that
former corporate counsel was clearly "an agent" of the corporation and
was encompassed within the meaning of section 317(d) of California's
Corporation Act'6 0 during the time he represented the corporation and
committed the acts for which he was later sued. The court found the
statute "straightforward and unambiguous" and held that its "literal
terms" required considering attorneys as agents for the corporation
154. 83 Cal. App. 3d 790, 148 Cal. Rptr. 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
155. Cal. Corp. Code § 317(d) (West 1988).
156. Schigur, 83 Cal. App. 3d 790, 148 Cal. Rptr. 116.
157. See Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
158. Luessier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 4 Haw. App. 421, 667 P.2d 830 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1983).
159. 190 Cal. App. 3d 1604, 236 Cal. Rptr. 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
160. This section is analogous to section 607.0850(3), Florida Statutes.
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who would therefore be eligible for indemnification upon successfully
defending a legal malpractice action.16 1
However, at least one other court reached precisely the opposite
conclusion. In Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McCorkie & Bush-
nell,162 a Utah court decided that "agent" as defined by section 16-10-
4(2)(c), Utah Statutes,'63 did not include law firms engaged by corpo-
rations to give legal advice. The would-be "agent" seeking indemnifica-
tion in Western Fiberglass was an attorney sued for malpractice after
rendering advice to a corporation. While the jury found for the attor-
ney on one count, it found the attorney and the corporation equally
negligent on another. The Western Fiberglass court used a combination
of policy and statutory analysis to reach its determination, and dis-
missed the Katayarna analysis as "one unpublished decision" without
any further discussion. 64 The court concluded that the statutory defini-
tion of "agent" referred to persons with management discretion and the
ability to bind the corporation. 165
If the statute were truly intended to be limited to managing or
controlling persons, why was the broad language of "agent or em-
ployee" chosen? This reasoning would also preclude mandatory indem-
nification of attorneys who were sued by third parties along with the
corporation and its management, for acts done at the corporation's dis-
cretion. Eliminating attorney entitlement to mandatory indemnification
in all instances could have serious ramifications. Corporations could be
deprived of the full assistance of counsel based upon the chilling effect
of claims either not necessarily covered by malpractice insurance, or
excessive premiums based from loss experience. The court in Western
Fiberglass was obviously reaching for a means to avoid the unconscion-
able indemnification of an attorney found negligent.
Moreover, although the Legislature may never have intended sec-
tion 607.0850(3) to apply to derivative actions, there is nothing in the
statute to dictate otherwise. To the contrary, the Third District Court
of Appeal indicated in dictum contained in Winner'66 that former
607.014(3), now 607.0850(3), would apply to derivative actions.
161. Id. The court also saw no policy reasons why this construction should not be
allowed, as corporations were often subjected to rules not imposed on real persons, and
were likely to be able to pursue expensive litigation more easily than an individual.
162. 789 P. 2d 34 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
163. This section is analogous to section 607.0850, Florida Statutes.
164. 789 P.2d at 36.
165. Id. at 38.
166. Winner v. Cataldo, 559 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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Section 607.07401(5),167 which assumably was supposed to strike
a careful balance between the rights of majority and minority stock-
holders, is undermined. The policy of encouraging meritorious deriva-
tive claims is frustrated by the availability of mandatory indemnifica-
tion under 607.0850(3), which is apparently available to any successful
corporate official defendant, regardless of the culpability of his code-
fendants, or even his own wrongdoing, so long as he prevails. Even
plaintiffs with meritorious claims may be reluctant to sue if they face a
"stonewall" defense, and the prospect of paying not only their own fees,
but funding management's defense indirectly through their investment
in the corporation.
Section 607.0850(3) should either be expressly excepted from ap-
plication to derivative actions, or the Legislature should arrive at a con-
sistent approach to indemnification. We suggest at the very least re-
quiring success on the merits.
Corporate officials who are innocent or merely negligent are enti-
tled to protection. Otherwise, there is little purpose in establishing a
corporation at all. Furthermore, excessive risks to officers and directors
will tend to discourage any responsible individual from serving. What
possible justification can there be, however, for rewarding the inten-
tional wrongdoer?
APPENDIX
Section 607.0850 is entitled: "Indemnification of officers, directors,
employees, and agents" and provides:
(1) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who
was or is a party to any proceeding (other than an action by, or in the
right of, the corporation), by reason of the fact that he is or was a
director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation or is or was serv-
ing at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee, or
agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other
enterprise against liability incurred in connection with such proceeding,
including any appeal thereof, if he acted in good faith and in a manner
he reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of
the corporation and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding,
had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The ter-
mination of any proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, or convic-
tion or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent shall not, of
167. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
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itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith
and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed
to, the best interests of the corporation or, with respect to any criminal
action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct
was unlawful.
(2) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person, who
was or is a party to any proceeding by or in the right of the corporation
to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that he is or
was a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation or is or
was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, em-
ployee, or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture,
trust, or other enterprise, against expenses and amounts paid in settle-
ment not exceeding, in the judgment of the board of directors, the esti-
mated expense of litigating the proceeding to conclusion, actually and
reasonably incurred in connection with the defense or settlement of
such proceeding, including any appeal thereof. Such indemnification
shall be authorized if such person acted in good faith and in a manner
he reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of
the corporation, except that no indemnification shall be made under
this subsection in respect of any claim, issue, or matter as to which
such person shall have been adjudged to be liable unless, and only to
the extent that, the court in which such proceeding was brought, or any
other court of competent jurisdiction, shall determine upon application
that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all circum-
stances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to in-
demnity for such expenses which such court shall deem proper.
(3) To the extent that a director, officer, employee, or agent of a
corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of
any proceeding referred to in subsection (1) or subsection (2), or in
defense of any claim, issue, or matter therein, he shall be indemnified
against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection
therewith.
(4) Any indemnification under subsection (1) or subsection (2),
unless pursuant to a determination by a court, shall be made by the
corporation only as authorized in the specific case upon a determination
that indemnification of the director, officer, employee, or agent is
proper in the circumstances because he has met the applicable standard
of conduct set forth in subsection (1) or subsection (2). Such determi-
nation shall be made:
(a) By the board of directors by a majority vote of a quorum con-
sisting of directors who were not parties to such proceeding;
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(b) If such a quorum is not obtainable or, even if obtainable, by
majority vote of a committee duly designated by the board of directors
(in which directors who are parties may participate) consisting solely of
two or more directors not at the time parties to the proceeding;
(c) By independent legal counsel:
(1) Selected by the board of directors prescribed in paragraph (a)
or the committee prescribed in paragraph (b); or
(2) If a quorum of the directors cannot be obtained for paragraph
(a) and the committee cannot be designated under paragraph (b), se-
lected by majority vote of the full board of directors (in which directors
who are parties may participate); or
(d) By the shareholders by a majority vote of a quorum consisting
of shareholders who were not parties to such proceeding or, if no such
quorum is obtainable, by a majority vote of shareholders who were not
parties to such proceeding.
(5) Evaluation of the reasonableness of expenses and authorization
of indemnification shall be made in the same manner as the determina-
tion that indemnification is permissible. However, if the determination
of permissibility is made by independent legal counsel, persons specified
by paragraph (4)(c) shall evaluate the reasonableness of expenses and
may authorize indemnification.
(6) Expenses incurred by an officer or director in defending a civil
or criminal proceeding may be paid by the corporation in advance of
the final disposition of such proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking
by or on behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount if he is
ultimately found not to be entitled to indemnification by the corpora-
tion pursuant to this section. Expenses incurred by other employees and
agents may be paid in advance upon such terms or conditions that the
board of directors deems appropriate.
(7) The indemnification and advancement of expenses provided
pursuant to this section are not exclusive, and a corporation may make
any other or further indemnification or advancement of expenses of any
of its directors, officers, employees, or agents, under any bylaw, agree-
ment, vote of shareholders or disinterested directors, or otherwise, both
as to action in his official capacity and as to action in another capacity
while holding such office. However, indemnification or advancement of
expenses shall not be made to or on behalf of any director, officer, em-
ployee, or agent if a judgment or other final adjudication establishes
that his actions, or omissions to act, were material to the cause of ac-
tion so adjudicated and constitute:
(a) A violation of the criminal law, unless the director, officer, em-
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ployee, or agent had reasonable cause to believe his conduct was lawful
or had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful;
(b) A transaction from which the director, officer, employee, or
agent derived an improper personal benefit;
(c) In the case of a director, a circumstance under which the lia-
bility provisions of s. 607.0834 are applicable; or
(d) Wilful misconduct or a conscious disregard for the best inter-
ests of the corporation in a proceeding by or in the right of the corpora-
tion to procure a judgment in its favor of in a proceeding by or in the
right of a shareholder.
(8) Indemnification and advancement of expenses as provided in
this section shall continue as, unless otherwise provided when author-
ized or ratified, to a person who has ceased to be a director, officer,
employee, or agent and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors,
and administrators of such a person, unless otherwise provided when
authorized or ratified.
(9) Unless the corporation's articles of incorporation provide oth-
erwise, notwithstanding the failure of a corporation to provide indemni-
fication, and despite any contrary determination of the board or of the
shareholders in the specific case, a director, officer, employee, or agent
of the corporation who is or was a party to a proceeding may apply for
indemnification or advancement of expenses, or both, to the court con-
ducting the proceeding, to the circuit court, or to another court of com-
petent jurisdiction. On receipt of an application, the court, after giving
any notice that it considers necessary, may order indemnification and
advancement of expenses, including expenses incurred in seeking court-
ordered indemnification or advancement of expenses, if it determines
that:
(a) The director, officer, employee, or agent is entitled to
mandatory indemnification under subsection (3), in which case the
court shall also order the corporation to pay the director reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining court-ordered indemnification or ad-
vancement of expenses;
(b) The director, officer, employee, or agent is entitled to indemni-
fication or advancement of expenses, or both, by virtue of the exercise
by the corporation of its power pursuant to subsection (7); or
(c) The director, officer, employee, or agent is fairly and reasona-
bly entitled to indemnification or advancement of expenses, or both, in
view of all the relevant circumstances, regardless of whether such per-
son met the standard of conduct set forth in subsection (1), subsection
(2), or subsection (7).
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(10) For purposes of this section, the term "corporation" includes,
in addition to the resulting corporation, any constituent corporation (in-
cluding any constituent of a constituent) absorbed in a consolidation or
merger, so that any person who is or was a director, officer, employee,
or agent of a constituent corporation, or is or was serving at the request
of a constituent corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of
another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enter-
prise, is in the same position under this section with respect to the re-
sulting or surviving corporation as he would have with respect to such
constituent corporation if its separate existence had continued.
(11) For purposes of this section:
(a) The term "other enterprises" includes employee benefit plans;
(b) The term "expenses" includes counsel fees, including those for
appeal;
(c) The term "liability" includes obligations to pay a judgment,
settlement, penalty, fine (including an excise tax assessed with respect
to any employee benefit plan), and expenses actually and reasonably
incurred with respect to a proceeding;
(d) The term "proceeding" includes any threatened. pending, or
completed action, suit, or other type of proceeding, whether civil, crimi-
nal, administrative, or investigative and whether formal or informal;
(e) The term "agent" includes a volunteer;
(f) The term "serving at the request of the corporation" includes
any service as a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation
that imposes duties on such persons, including duties relating to an em-
ployee benefit plan and its participants or beneficiaries; and
(g) The term "not opposed to the best interest of the corporation"
describes the actions of a person who acts in good faith and in a man-
ner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the participants
and beneficiaries of an employee benefit plan.
(12) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain in-
surance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, em-
ployee, or agent of the corporation or is or was serving at the request of
the corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another cor-
poration, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise against
any liability asserted against him and incurred by him in any such ca-
pacity or arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corpora-
tion would have the power to indemnify him against such liability
under the provisions of this section.
Companion section 607.0831, entitled "Liability of directors,"
provides:
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(1) A director is not personally liable for monetary damages to the
corporation or any other person for any statement, vote, decision, or
failure to act, regarding corporate management or policy, by a director,
unless:
(a) The director breached or failed to perform his duties as a di-
rector; and
(b) The director's breach of, or failure to perform, those duties
constitutes:
1. A violation of the criminal law, unless the director had reasona-
ble cause to believe his conduct was lawful or had no reasonable cause
to believe his conduct was unlawful. A judgment or other final adjudi-
cation against a director in any criminal proceeding for a violation of
the criminal law estops that director from contesting the fact that his
breach, or failure to perform, constitutes a violation of the criminal
law; but does not estop the director from establishing that he had rea-
sonable cause to believe that his conduct was lawful or had no reasona-
,ble cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful;
2. A transaction from which the director derived an improper per-
sonal benefit, either directly or indirectly;
3. A circumstance under which the liability provisions of s.
607.0834 are applicable;
4. In a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation to procure
a judgment in its favor or by or in the right of a shareholder, conscious
disregard for the best interest of the corporation, or willful misconduct;
or
5. In a proceeding by or in the right of someone other than the
corporation or a shareholder, recklessness or an act or omission which
was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or
property.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term "recklessness" means
the action, or omission to act, in conscious disregard of a risk:
(a) Known, or so obvious that it should have been known, to the
director; and
(b) Known to the director, or so obvious that it should have been
known, to be so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow from such action or omission.
(3) A director is deemed not to have derived an improper personal
benefit from any transaction if the transaction and the nature of any
personal benefit derived by the director are not prohibited by state or
federal law or regulation and, without further limitation:
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(a) In an action other than a derivative suit regarding a decision
by the director to approve, reflect, or otherwise affect the outcome of
an offer to purchase the stock of, or to effect a merger of, the corpora-
tion, the transaction and the nature of any personal benefits derived by
a director are disclosed or known to all directors voting on the matter,
and the transaction was authorized, approved, or ratified by at least
two directors who comprise a majority of the disinterested directors
(whether or not such disinterested directors constitute a quorum);
(b) The transaction and the nature of any personal benefits de-
rived by a director are disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled
to vote, and the transaction was authorized, approved, or ratified by the
affirmative vote or written consent of such shareholders who hold a ma-
jority of the shares, the voting of which is not controlled by directors
who derived a personal benefit from or otherwise had a personal inter-
est in the transaction;
(c) The transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation at
the time it was authorized by the board, a committee, or the sharehold-
ers, notwithstanding that a director received a personal benefit.
(4) Common or interested directors may be counted in determin-
ing the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors
which authorizes, approves, or ratifies such a transaction.
(5) The circumstances set forth in subsection (3) are not exclusive
and do not preclude the existence of other circumstances under which a
director will be deemed not to have derived an improper benefit.
(6) The provisions of this section shall also apply to officers of non-
profit organizations as provided in s.617.0285.
Section 607.07401, transferred from section 607.0740 by section
148, Chapter 90-179 Florida Laws, is entitled "Shareholders' derivative
actions," and provides:
(1) A person may not commence a proceeding in the right of a
domestic or foreign corporation unless the person was a shareholder of
the corporation when the transaction complained of occurred or unless
the person became a shareholder through transfer by operation of law
from one who was a shareholder at that time.
(2) A complaint in a proceeding brought in the right of a corpora-
tion must be verified and allege with particularity the demand made to
obtain action by the board of directors and that the demand was re-
fused or ignored. If the corporation commences an investigation of the
charges made in the demand or complaint, the court may stay any pro-
ceeding until the investigation is completed.
(3) The court may dismiss a derivative proceeding if, on motion by
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the corporation, the court finds that one of the groups specified below
has made a determination in good faith after conducting a reasonable
investigation upon which its conclusions are based that the mainte-
nance of the derivative suit is not in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. The corporation shall have the burden of proving the indepen-
dence and good faith of the group making the determination and the
reasonableness of the investigation. The determination shall be made
by:
(a) A majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting
of the board of directors, if the independent directors constitute a
quorum;
(b) A majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more inde-
pendent directors appointed by a majority vote of independent directors
present at a meeting of the board of directors, whether or not such
independent directors constitute a quorum; or
(c) A panel of one or more independent persons appointed by the
court upon motion by the corporation.
(4) A proceeding commenced under this section may not be dis-
continued or settled without the court's approval. If the court deter-
mines that a proposed discontinuance or settlement will substantially
affect the interest of the corporation's shareholders or a class, series, or
voting group of shareholders, the court shall direct that notice be given
to the shareholders affected. The court may determine which party or
parties to the proceeding shall bear the expense of giving the notice.
(5) On termination of the proceeding, the court may require the
plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including reasona-
ble attorney's fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that
the proceeding was commenced without reasonable cause.
(6) The court may award reasonable expenses for maintaining the
proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees, to a successful plain-
tiff or to the person commencing the proceeding who receives any re-
lief, whether by judgment, compromise, or settlement, and require that
the person account for the remainder of any proceeds to the corpora-
tion; however, this subsection does not apply to any relief rendered for
the benefit of injured shareholders only and limited to a recovery of the
loss or damage of the injured shareholders.
(7) For purposes of this section, "shareholder" includes a benefi-
cial owner whose shares are held in a voting trust or held by a nominee
on his behalf.
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